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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

BRAD HEATER,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NOS. 46042-2018 & 46043-2018
PAYETTE COUNTY NOS. CR-2017-786
& CR-2017-812
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Brad Heater pled guilty to one count of arson and one
count of grand theft by possession in two separate cases. He received an aggregate unified
sentence of twenty-four years, with sixteen years fixed. On appeal, Mr. Heater asserts that the
district court erred when it permitted a victim impact statement over his objection. Mr. Heater
also contends that his sentences represent an abuse of the district court's discretion, as they are
excessive given any view of the facts.

1

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
The appeals in Idaho Supreme Court case numbers 46042-2018 (Payette County case
number CR-2017-782) and 46043-2018 (Payette County case number CR-2017-812) were
ordered consolidated. (R.46042, p.117; R.46043, p.100.)
In the arson case (No. 46042-2018), on April 24, 2017, an officer was driving down the
street when he observed a large amount of smoke.

(Presentence Investigation Report

(hereinafter, PSI), pp.21-22; R.46042, p.21.) Upon further investigation, he discovered a pickup

truck on fire. (PSI, pp.21-22; R.46042, p.21.) The house in which the truck was parked in front
of was unoccupied at the time, as the owner had been out of town for several weeks. (PSI, p.24;
R.46042, p.23.) Brad Heater was identified as a suspect and the vehicle's owner advised law
enforcement that, twenty years ago, she had been married to Mr. Heater, and they had purchased
the truck while married. (PSI, p.22; R.46042, p.24.) The couple divorced several years later and
she was awarded the truck during the proceedings.

(4/10/18 Tr., p.17, L.24 - p.19, L.25;

R.46042, p.24.) Mr. Heater was interviewed, and he admitted to lighting the unoccupied truck
on fire. (PSI, p.24.) When a search warrant was executed on his home, law enforcement located
a substance suspected of being methamphetamine and a small pistol.

(R.46042, p.22.)

Mr. Heater was also identified as a person involved in a fire in an unoccupied camp trailer. (PSI,
p.21.)
In the grand theft case (No. 46043-2018), Mr. Heater was found in possession of two
pressure tanks and two cutting torches valued at $1,400. (PSI, pp.22-23.) The two pressure
tanks had been drilled and so were valueless-used for display purposes, only. (R.46043, pp.1920.) The items were taken from a business. (PSI, p.22.)
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Based on these facts, Mr. Heater was charged by information with one count of first
degree arson, one count of third degree arson, one count of possession of methamphetamine, and
one count of felon in possession of a firearm in the "arson" case. (R.46042, pp.46-48.) In the
"grand theft" case, Mr. Heater was charged with one count of grand theft by possession.
(R.46043, pp.34-36.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Heater pied guilty to third degree arson
and grand theft bypossession. 1 (1/19/18 Tr., p.6, Ls.9-23; p.13, L.4-p.16, L.5; R.46042, pp.5862; R.46043, pp.46-50.) In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the first degree arson, the
possession of a controlled substance, and the felon in possession of a firearm charges. (1/19/18
Tr., p.6, L.18; R.46042, p.60; R.46043, p.48.) The State also agreed not to file charges in a few
other investigations, but that Mr. Heater would agree to pay restitution on the uncharged and the
dismissed cases. (1/19/18 Tr., p.6, Ls.19-23.) The plea agreement did not contain sentencing
recommendations. (1/19/18 Tr., p.7, Ls.1-4; R.46042, p.60; R.46043, p.48.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State called Mr. Heater's ex-wife, the owner of the truck,
to make a victim impact statement. (5/4/18 Tr., p.6, L.16; p.10, Ls.8-13.) Defense counsel
objected to the scope of her anticipated testimony, anticipating it would be testimony of
uncharged past crimes in another state, similar to what had been included in the Presentencing
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An Amended Plea Agreement was signed by the parties in which Mr. Heater purportedly
agreed "to waive my right to appeal this case and subsequent sentence." (R.46042, p.61;
R.46043, p.49.) However, while all of the salient terms of the plea agreement were discussed at
the change of plea hearing, the waiver of Mr. Heater's appellate rights was never put on the
record at the change of plea hearing. (1/19/18 Tr., p.6, L.9 - p.10, L.20.) Thus, it is unclear
whether Mr. Heater was aware of the provision in the written plea agreement and knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right. Cf, State v. Murphy, 125 Idaho 456, 457 (1994) (holding
defendant was not coerced and knew full well the consequences of waiving his right to appeal
the judgment and sentence were district court conducted colloquy wherein the judge specifically
inquired about defendant's waiver of his right to appeal and confirmed that he had no questions
about that waiver); State v. Cope, 142 Idaho 492 (2006) (holding that the record showed the plea
was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary where defendant signed plea agreement in open court).
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Investigation Report. (5/4/18 Tr., p.6, Ls.16-21.) The district court “overrule[d] the objection to
the extent that she has personal knowledge of the information” and allowed Mr. Heater’s ex-wife
to testify. (5/4/18 Tr., p.7, Ls.6-8.) Mr. Heater’s ex-wife told the district court of an incident
that occurred over twenty years ago, when she and Mr. Heater were still married. (5/4/18
Tr., p.8, L.18 – p.9, L.24.) Apparently Mr. Heater left their dog in a shopping cart in the parking
lot of a hardware store. (5/4/18 Tr., p.8, L.21 – p.9, L.1.) Mr. Heater’s ex-wife described the
steps necessary for her to retrieve the dog from the grocery store parking lot. (5/4/18 Tr., p.9,
Ls.2-10.) Thereafter, she addressed the effect of the burned truck on her income and health.
(5/4/18 Tr., p.9, L.10 – p.10, L.13.)
The State asked the district court to sentence Mr. Heater to an aggregate unified sentence
of twenty-four years, with twelve years fixed. (5/4/18 Tr., p.16, Ls.21-23.) Mr. Heater’s counsel
asked the district court to sentence Mr. Heater to a short amount of fixed time so he could engage
in treatment programs or to retain jurisdiction. (5/4/18 Tr., p.21, Ls.11-23.) Mr. Heater was
sentenced to ten years, with seven years fixed, on the third degree arson and fourteen years, with
nine years fixed, on the grand theft by possession. (5/4/18 Tr., p.25, Ls.9-19; R.46042, pp.106107; R.46043, pp.87-88.) The sentence for grand theft was ordered to be served consecutively to
the arson sentence, for a total sentence of twenty-four years, with sixteen years fixed. (5/4/18
Tr., p.25, Ls.18-19; R.46042, pp.106-107; R.46043, pp.87-88.)
Mr. Heater filed notices of appeal timely from the judgments of conviction. (R.46042,
pp.108-109, 118-127; R.46043, pp.94-95.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err by allowing the victim to testify as to uncharged conduct that
occurred 20 years ear lier?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed an aggregate unified sentence
of twenty-four years, with sixteen years fixed, upon Mr. Heater following his pleas of
guilty to third degree arson and grand theft by possession?

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Permitted The Victim To Make A Victim Impact Statement
Which Included Testimony Of Uncharged Conduct That Occurred In Another State Twenty
Years Earlier
A.

Introduction
Victim impact statements are admissible at sentencing provided they do not result in

"manifest injustice." In this case, over defense counsel's objection, the district court admitted
statements made by a victim which contained information about prior bad acts that occurred
approximately 20 years earlier, and which were entirely unrelated to the case on which
Mr. Heater was being sentenced. Further, there was no notice to defense counsel or Mr. Heater
that he would be required to defend against the information the victim chose to offer to the
district court. Thus, the admission of the victim's impact statement was erroneous where it
resulted in "manifest injustice" to Mr. Heater's ability to prepare for his sentencing hearing.

B.

Standard Of Review
The interpretation of Idaho Code section 19-5306 is a question of law over which the

appellate courts exercise free review. State v. Lampien, 149 Idaho 367, 373 (2009).
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C.

The District Court Erred When It Admitted The Victim's Impact Statement
Article I, Section 22(6) of the Idaho Constitution, provides that the victim of a crime has

the right "to be heard, upon request, at all criminal justice proceedings considering a plea of
guilty, sentencing, incarceration or release of the defendant, unless manifest injustice would
result." See also I.C. § 19-5306(1)(e) (providing that a victim of a criminal offense shall be
heard, upon request, at all criminal proceedings including sentencing "unless manifest injustice
would result"); I.C.R. 32(b)(1 ).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held:
Both rights [under I.C. 19-5306(1)(e), (h)] are rarely limited. The victim's right to
be heard is limited only when it results in manifest injustice. Idaho Const. art. I, §
22; LC. § 19-5306(1)(e); see also State v. Grant, 154 Idaho 281, 287, 297 P.3d
244, 250 (2013).
State v. Hansen, 156 Idaho 169, 174 (2014).

A victim's right to be heard may be exercised through a victim impact statement at the
defendant's sentencing hearing. Id. 156 Idaho at 173. "A victim has a right to address the court
at the defendant's sentencing, unless manifest injustice would result." Lampien, 148 Idaho at
374; LC.§ 19-5306(1)(e). Under the Compensation of Victims of Crimes Act, LC.§§ 19-5301
to 5307, a "victim" is defined as "an individual who suffers direct or threatened physical,
financial or emotion harm as a result of the commission of a crime or juvenile offense."
LC.§ 19-5306(5)(a) (emphasis added). Although the admission of evidence at sentencing is
usually within the broad discretion of the district court, such is not the case with victim impact
evidence. Hansen, 156 Idaho at 174 (holding district court did not err by admitting a statement
from the victim's father despite the fact that victim was not a minor and victim also testified at
the sentencing hearing). "So long as manifest injustice is avoided, the sentencing court has no
discretion to exclude a victim impact statement." State v. Deisz, 145 Idaho 826, 832 (Ct. App.
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2008) (holding defendant failed to show the district court erred in its use of a victim impact
statement containing a sentencing recommendation). Although “manifest injustice” has not been
defined specific to the Compensation of Victims of Crimes Act, the Idaho Court of Appeals has
held that no “manifest injustice” resulted from the court viewing, at the sentencing of a defendant
for murder, of a five-minute video depicting the victim interacting with her family members and
her children. State v. Leon, 142 Idaho 705, 710 (Ct. App. 2006).
Here, the victim impact statement was manifestly injust where Mr. Heater’s ex-wife, the
owner of the truck, made a victim impact statement in which she referenced Mr. Heater’s prior
bad conduct (and conduct likely abhorrent to a dog lover) from over twenty years earlier.
(5/4/18 Tr., p.6, L.16; p.10, Ls.8-13.)

The district court had overruled defense counsel’s

objection, permitting her to testify “to the extent that she has personal knowledge of the
information.

I think she can talk about that.”

(5/4/18 Tr., p.6, Ls.16-21; p.7, Ls.6-8.)

Mr. Heater’s ex-wife told the district court of an incident that occurred over twenty years prior,
when she and Mr. Heater were still married. (5/4/18 Tr., p.8, L.18 – p.9, L.24.) She said that
Mr. Heater had left their dog in a shopping cart in the parking lot of a hardware store in Nevada.
(5/4/18 Tr., p.8, L.21 – p.9, L.4.) Mr. Heater’s ex-wife described the steps necessary for her to
retrieve the dog from the grocery store parking lot, where she was working in Eugene, Oregon, at
the time. (5/4/18 Tr., p.9, Ls.2-10.) Thereafter, she addressed the effect of the burned truck on
her income and health. (5/4/18 Tr., p.9, L.10 – p.10, L.13.)
The district court sentenced Mr. Heater, for the grand theft and arson charges, to a total
sentence of twenty-four years, with sixteen years fixed. (5/4/18 Tr., p.25, Ls.18-19; R.46042,
pp.106-107; R.46043, pp.87-88.) As asserted in Section II, such a sentence was excessive given
any view of the facts.
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The district court erred in permitting Mr. Heater's ex-wife to testify at sentencing about
irrelevant conduct occurring during the time they were married some twenty years ago, which
was prejudicial to Mr. Heater as he had no warning that this conduct from over twenty years ago
would be brought before the district court. The admission of this information as a victim impact
statement was highly prejudicial, may have resulted in a longer sentence than the district court
would have otherwise imposed, and resulted in manifest injustice. The district court erred, and
Mr. Heater should be resentenced, in front of a different district court judge.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed An Aggregate Unified Sentence Of
Twenty-Four Years, With Sixteen Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Heater Following His Pleas Of Guilty
To Third Degree Arson And Grand Theft By Possession
Mr. Heater asserts that, given any view of the facts, his aggregate unified sentence of
twenty-four years, with sixteen years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an
independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character
of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771
(Ct. App. 1982). In reviewing a trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion, the relevant
inquiry regards four factors:
Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached
its decision by the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).

Mr. Heater does not allege that his sentences exceed the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show the district court abused its discretion by failing to reach its
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decision by the exercise of reason, Mr. Heater must show that in light of the governing criteria,
the sentences were excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual
and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution
for wrongdoing. Id.
In light of the mitigating factors present in this case, Mr. Heater’s sentences are excessive
considering any view of the facts.
Mr. Heater had been sober from methamphetamine for five years, up until his father’s
death in 2017. (PSI, pp.41, 50.) Mr. Heater relapsed and began using methamphetamine again,
which he accounts for his current criminal conduct. (PSI, pp.43, 46, 50.) Mr. Heater has
demonstrated that he is capable of maintaining sobriety for lengthy periods of time. He was
sober from 2007 until 2011, and again from 2012 to 2017. (PSI, p.41.) Mr. Heater recognizes
that every problem he has had in his life has been the result of his addiction. (5/4/18 Tr., p.19,
L.24 – p.20, L.2.) Mr. Heater has demonstrated his rehabilitative potential, and the district court
erred by sentencing him excessively. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that substance abuse
should be considered as a mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes
sentence. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982). In Nice, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a
sentence based on Nice’s lack of prior record and the fact that “the trial court did not give proper
consideration of the defendant’s alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing defendant to
commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the problem.”

Id. at 91.

Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that ingestion of drugs and alcohol resulting in
impaired capacity to appreciate the criminality of conduct, could be a mitigating circumstance.
State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 (1981).

9

Mr. Heater does have a supportive family to assist him in his rehabilitation. Mr. Heater
has a good relationship with his mother, who is in an assisted care facility.

(PSI, p.36.)

Mr. Heater had a very close relationship with his father, whom he considered his best friend;
however, Mr. Heater’s father passed away shortly before Mr. Heater incurred these charges.
(PSI, pp.36, 43.) Mr. Heater was devastated by his father’s death and had great difficulty coping
with his distress. (PSI, pp.37, 43.) Mr. Heater also has a very supportive girlfriend, who has
stood by him during the pending charges and incarceration. (PSI, pp.4-5, 37-38, 43.) his family
is very important to him. (PSI, p.42.)
Mr. Heater also has strong support in the community. (PSI, pp.1-6.) Members of the
community wrote that Mr. Heater “has a good heart” and “shows genuine concern for friends and
family.” (PSI, p.1.) A customer who had Mr. Heater’s construction company build him and his
wife a home extolled Mr. Heater’s virtues both as a contractor and as a friend. (PSI, p.2.) A
long-time friend of Mr. Heater’s wrote to the court that Mr. Heater is an upstanding contractor
and a hard worker. (PSI, p.3.) Members of the community wrote that Mr. Heater was a “kind
and fair person to work with.” (PSI, p.6.)
Further, Mr. Heater expressed remorse and accepted responsibility for his actions.
(1/19/18 Tr., p.6, Ls.9-23; p.13, L.4 – p.16, L.5; 5/4/18 Tr., p.22, L.18 – p.23, L.4; PSI, pp.24-25,
43.) At his sentencing hearing, Mr. Heater expressed regret to the victim for his actions. (5/4/18
Tr., p.22, Ls.18-25.) He told the court that he just wanted to say that he was very sorry. (5/4/18
Tr., p.22, Ls.15-19.)

Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a defendant

expresses remorse for his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. Shideler, 103 Idaho at
595; State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991).

10

The issue of reducing a sentence because a defendant expresses remorse has been
addressed in several cases. For example, in Alberts, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that some
leniency is required when the defendant has expressed “remorse for his conduct, his recognition
of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other positive attributes of his character.”
Alberts, 124 Idaho at 209.
The Idaho Supreme Court has also reduced a defendant’s term of imprisonment because
the defendant expressed regret for what he had done. Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595. In Shideler,
the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the prospect of Shideler’s recovery from his poor mental and
physical health, which included mood swings, violent outbursts, and drug abuse, coupled with
his remorse for his actions, was so compelling that it outweighed the gravity of the crimes of
armed robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during the commission
of a crime.

Id. at 594-95.

Therefore, the Court reduced Shideler’s sentence from an

indeterminate term not to exceed twenty years to an indeterminate term not to exceed twelve
years. Id. at 593.
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Heater asserts that the district court abused
its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts that had the district court
properly considered his remorse, controlled substances addiction, and his family and community
support, it would have imposed less severe sentences.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Heater respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentences as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his cases be remanded to the district court for new
sentencing hearings in front of a different district court judge.
DATED this 26 th day of March, 2019.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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